The Constitutional Council would monitor and regulate all lobbying.
Remarks
(Lobbying is a much-used colloquial term to refer to the work of ‘lobbyists’, another colloquial term used to identify a person or group of persons who conduct campaigns to influence members of a legislature to vote according to the group's special interest.)
There are various real and legitimate needs for influential individuals and corporations to be involved in the drafting of much legislation; but at the present time such individuals and corporations generally have influence far out of proportion to the interests of the rest of the public, sometimes to the exclusion of the rest of the republic.
The role of the Constitutional Council is not to get involved in the crafting of legislation or to arbitrate differences of opinions; that fits squarely into the role of legislators. The role of the Constitutional Council is to monitor and be aware of whatever lobbying is under way and to call attention to situations where parties absent from the lobby activities are being inadequately regarded. (A very frequent lobbying scenario is where large corporations are suggesting regulations of their industry which would have the effect of crushing their smaller competitors, who are oblivious to the schemes under consideration.)
Another role of the Constitutional Council is to watch out for bribery. Presumably blatant bribery – money in envelopes, paid-for vacations, etc., -- would be fairly easily prevented, but the greater concern would be the subtle tentacles of bribery, e.g., children of the legislator’s families or friends getting into prestigious colleges, perhaps even with a partial scholarship, beyond their apparent ability.
Control of the practice of lobbying is a special category of ethics which is probably the single most corrupting aspect of our presently corrupt state of legislative affairs. The general objective for the Constitutional Council is to provide a clear and above-board process for all parties to present their case for how policy should be fashioned on the one hand, and on the other hand to provide whatever measures are necessary to prevent present day brokers of concentrated power and financial interests from trampling on and trumping, in myriad hidden ways, the interests of the rest of the public. The present abuses of lobbying and crony capitalism are legion, and so are the opportunities to bring them under control.
There is no need here to anticipate exactly what measure the Constitutional Council may deem appropriate to rein in the excesses of lobbying as it is presently practiced, except to say that the excesses of lobbying are a major reason for the need to have a Constitutional Council.
A possible expedient that might help to bring this practice under control might be for the Constitutional Council to have a collection of meeting rooms which could be available for lobbyists to make their case to legislators. In such cases a lobbyist would seek to reserve such a room to meet with a congressman. When the meeting takes place, it would be monitored with one or more Councilors. If the lobbyist wants to provide to the congressman a draft for how a portion of legislation under consideration might be written, copies of the draft would be provided for the Constitutional Council as well.
